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356 Abstract
This paper addresses two main questions: (1) how far do the activities of fiscal 
councils in the EU countries help promote transparency and accountability in the 
management of public finances and (2) how could fiscal councils enhance the 
impact of those activities? The analysis is based on a questionnaire collected in 
2016 from fiscal councils in 18 EU countries. The questionnaire looked at how the 
councils themselves assessed their impact on the management of public finances, 
and how they communicated their findings to the wider public. The councils see 
some benefits of their work; and their monitoring of adherence to fiscal rules and 
legislative regulation, as well as their warnings about excessive government spend-
ing, seem to get noticed in the media. This activity informs the public, and may in 
turn influence politicians’ ratings, thereby helping to contribute to greater account-
ability in the management of public finances. The paper consequently argues that 
fiscal councils may promote fiscal transparency and accountability and proposes 
several ways to enhance the effectiveness of their influence on media.
Keywords: fiscal councils, fiscal transparency, fiscal accountability, fiscal policy 
communication, media influence
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies how fiscal councils in selected EU countries influence fiscal 
transparency and the accountability of politicians for the management of public 
finances. The question of whether fiscal councils can increase the visibility of 
compliance with fiscal rules through active communication with the public is 
important for several reasons. Media, especially digital media, can provide infor-
mation that has bearing on the political ratings of the individuals and organisa-
tions in charge of managing public finances in more or less real time. Owing to 
competition among media outlets, that information is likely to affect the reputa-
tion of politicians responsible for government budgets.1
Fiscal councils are independent public institutions whose broad goal is to promote 
sustainable public finances. They have a mandate to assess fiscal plans, evaluate 
macroeconomic or budgetary forecasts of fiscal authorities, and make other analy-
ses that may contribute to the public debate on fiscal policy and fiscal transpar-
ency (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2010; IMF, 2013). To build their credibility, 
fiscal councils seek to establish a track record of solid analysis and effective pub-
lic announcements.2 Based on information about government activities, voters and 
financial markets are better able to assess government’s fiscal position, present 
and future costs and benefits of various tax and expenditure proposals, and the 
longer-term consequences of fiscal policy on the economy and the society (Kopits 
and Craig, 1988). This can in principle enhance fiscal accountability, i.e. provide 
1 “Fiscal councils do not directly affect fiscal policy, their influence hinges importantly on the reputational and 
electoral impact of their analyses on fiscal policymakers” (Debrun et al., 2013:52).
2 Transparency refers to the publication of relevant, accessible, timely and accurate information on activities, 



































































44 (3) 355-384 (2020)
357incentives for politicians in the executive branch to act more responsibly and face 
the consequences of poor decisions (OECD, 2002).
This paper uses findings from a questionnaire collected from eighteen fiscal coun-
cils in EU countries. The main research question is whether more effective com-
munications of  fiscal councils with the public helped to improve fiscal transparency 
and accountability. The paper finds some limited evidence to support this view.
The next sections will briefly review the literature, presents the data and research 
methodology, discuss the results and develop arguments for the importance of 
councils’ improved communications with the public. 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
This paper draws on the rich political economy literature studying the activities of 
fiscal councils (Schuknecht, 2004; Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2010; Wyplosz, 
2012; 2015; Debrun et al., 2013; Schick, 2010; 2013). One of the recurring themes 
is that fiscal councils can improve democratic accountability and discourage 
opportunistic shifts in fiscal policy, such as pre-electoral spending sprees, by fos-
tering transparency over the political cycle. Through independent analysis, assess-
ments and forecasts, such bodies can raise public awareness about the conse-
quences of certain policy paths, and thereby contribute to a culture of stability in 
public finances. Fiscal councils can thus raise the reputational and electoral costs 
of unsound policies and broken commitments. They can also provide valuable 
direct input in the budget process, such as independent forecasts or assessments of 
structural fiscal positions, thereby closing technical loopholes that allow govern-
ments to circumvent numerical fiscal rules (Debrun et al., 2013, 7-8).
Another recurring theme is that fiscal councils help enhance the transparency and 
accountability of public finances. By publicly commenting on fiscal policy and 
analysing government budgets, fiscal councils are prima facie instruments of fis-
cal transparency. Moreover, given the right conditions, they can generate a posi-
tive feedback loop for fiscal transparency: a wider public, better educated in fiscal 
policy, will demand more and better information on government budgets from 
public officials. The officials will likely oblige and provide such information for 
the sake of their own reputation; the councils will process and disseminate it; the 
public will evaluate their analysis, and so on. In Sweden, for instance, the fiscal 
council has an explicit mandate to assess the transparency of budget documents.
The more the councils are present in the media, the more they are likely to affect 
the fiscal policy public debate and be perceived as independent. This paper focuses 
on fiscal councils’ media influence as a potential instrument for increasing the 
transparency and accountability of public finances. Although the councils may 
well be uniquely positioned to promote fiscal transparency and accountability, 
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358 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data for this study were collected from a questionnaire designed by the author and 
filled out by representatives of fiscal councils in 18 EU countries. The full ques-
tionnaire is shown in the Appendix and the councils that responded are listed in 
Table A1. The overall response rate was 72% (18 out of 25 fiscal councils). 
Responses from the fiscal councils in Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom were selected for more in-depth study, and were 
supplemented with analysis of research papers and reports on their operation. 
The questionnaire was designed and processed as anonymous in order to obtain a 
higher response rate and assure respondents of the confidentiality of their responses. 
Table 1
Number and percent of answers to individual questions in the questionnaire (N = 18) 
Questions (variable) N %
How does your fiscal council communicate with the public? 18 100
How often does your fiscal council communicate with the public? 16  89
What is the average annual media coverage of the activities of your fiscal 
council? 13  72
Which of the media issues the largest number of releases on the work of 
your fiscal council? 16  89
How do you assess the media visibility of compliance with fiscal rules? 17  94
How do you assess the media visibility of noncompliance with fiscal rules? 16  89
Please describe the reaction of the government in relation to the 
assessment of noncompliance with national fiscal rules 15  83
How to increase the media visibility of compliance with the rules? 15  83
Does the higher media visibility of compliance with the rules and more 
effective communication of the council contribute to transparency and 
(politicians’) accountability in the budget process? 
15  83
How to increase the impact of councils on fiscal transparency and 
(politicians’) accountability in the budget process? 11  61
How do you estimate the level of information of your citizens about the 
existence and activities of your fiscal council? 15  83
What has so far been the impact of your fiscal council on public 
information about the state of public finances and on the increase in fiscal 
transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? 
17  94
How does the public respond to the information in the media about the 
lack of transparency and about (politicians’) responsibility in the budget 
process?
13  72
How do fiscal rules and fiscal councils influence transparency and 
(politicians’) accountability in the budget process? 14  78
Do you think that fiscal rules and fiscal councils can be powerful 
communication tools in order to increase fiscal transparency and 
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3594 RESULTS
Graph 1 shows a comparison of the distribution of ratings for the question of how 
fiscal councils influence transparency and the accountability of politicians for the 
management of public finances. The results show that four out of 14 councils 
evaluate “public information disclosure” as the best way to influence the transpar-
ency and accountability of politicians in managing public finances. This was fol-
lowed by “communication through the media” and “promotion of transparency 
and accountability”. Two councils each highlighted “public disclosure of analysis, 
evaluation and reports” and “promoting good practice through transparency in the 
work of fiscal council”.
graph 1
Frequency of different answers to the question “How do fiscal rules and fiscal 
councils affect transparency and accountability of politicians for the management 

























Through the media – general information on public finances provided to the public through the 
media;
Public information disclosure – by publicly disclosing information about compliance with fiscal 
rules and frequent communication with the media;
Public disclosure of analysis, evaluation and reports – systematic communication of analysis, 
evaluation and reports produced by fiscal councils;
Promoting transparency and accountability – general efforts to promote fiscal transparency and 
accountability;
Promoting good practice – setting an example through the transparency of the work of the fis-
cal council.
Graph 2 shows the frequency of answers to questions on the impact of fiscal coun-
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360 majority of respondents, nine out of 15, evaluated the impact of councils on the 
state of public finances and fiscal transparency as “good”. Five respondents evalu-
ated the impact of their councils as “sufficient”, two as “very good”, and one as 
“insufficient”. 
graph 2 
Frequency of different answers to the question “What is the impact of your fiscal 
council on public information on the state of public finances, and on fiscal trans-












insufficient sufficient good very good
Source: Questionnaire responses.
Responses (not shown here) to related questions suggested a widespread lack of 
citizen awareness of the councils’ existence and activities; the relatively high 
effectiveness of communication through the media; also, the more widespread use 
of disclosure of information on councils’ websites rather than in the media.
Regarding channels of communication, all fiscal councils provided information on 
their websites (Table 2). Many also used press releases, interviews, press confer-
ences, presence in social media groups, and briefings. Only one council (in Latvia) 
developed a communication strategy fully in line with OECD recommendations.3
3 The OECD principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) state that “IFIs should develop effective 
communication channels from the outset, especially with the media, civil society, and other stakeholders”. 
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361Table 2




AT CY DK FR EL LV LT LU HR IE HU MT NL DE PT RO SE UK ∑
website ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 18
press 
releases ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 16
briefing ● ● ● ● ● ●  6
press con- 
ferences ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 13
social 
groups ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●  8





other ● ● ●
frequency 4 6 4 3 4 7 4 5 1 6 2 3 6 3 5 3 4 6
Source: Questionnaire responses.
Answers to Question 3 on the timing of councils’ communications (Table A2) sug-
gest that this is most intense for major fiscal events (for 12 out of 18 councils) and 
disclosure of information on compliance/non-compliance with fiscal rules (10 
councils). The councils most often give warnings about the state of public finances 
(Table A3) in the event of there being a discrepancy between the proposed budget 
and the outlined objectives, as well as in case of overoptimistic forecasts (9 coun-
cils each).
Media reports on fiscal councils’ communications (Table A4) mostly address 
 analyses, assessments and reports of the councils (as reported by 15 councils); 
councils’ criticism of government fiscal policy (9 cases); their reports on trends 
in deficits and public debts (8 cases); and their assessments of  fiscal transparency 
and accountability in the budget process (5 cases). One can detect a difference in 
councils’ assessment as between what they communicate and what the media report 
(Table 3). The media mostly cover analyses, evaluation and reports; criticisms of 
government fiscal policy and changes in deficits and public debt; and issues in 
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362 Table 3
Media coverage of most common topics communicated by councils
Communications Alerts Media releases
Most important fiscal  
events
Discrepancy between 
proposed budgets and fiscal 
goals / over-optimistic 
forecasts
Analyses, evaluations and 
reports
Information on compliance  
/ non-compliance with 
fiscal rules 
Excessive spending / raising 
public awareness of sound 
public finances
Criticisms of government 
fiscal policy and of changes 
in fiscal deficits and public 
debt
Announcement of fiscal 
policy changes / fiscal 
policy failures 
Actual state of fiscal policy Releases on transparency 
and accountability in the 
budget process / councils’ 
activities
Source: Questionnaire results and author’s comparison.
Somewhat surprising were answers to Question 5, on the media that issue the larg-
est number of releases on the work of councils. Print media were highlighted by 
16 out of 17 councils, while only five noted the digital media. Given the growing 
influence and importance of digital media, fiscal councils were expected to redi-
rect communication to these media in the future. 
Only four councils use international media to send messages about the govern-
ment’s fiscal policy to the world public (Question 7). This is surprising given that 
international news agencies tend to affect financial markets and “penalize the coun-
tries that violate fiscal rules” (Eyraud and Wu, 2015). Seven councils do not use 
international media, and seven consider it sufficient that the foreign media them-
selves transmit information published on councils’ websites, at press conferences, 
through social media or foreign correspondents. For example, the Irish IFAC sends 
reports for publication to the Network of European Council (EUFI) website.
Information on compliance with fiscal rules is publicly available on all councils’ 
web pages (Table 4). Most councils present reports on compliance with fiscal rules 
through press releases and presentations in parliament (12 each), half present 
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363Table 4
Is monitoring of the compliance with fiscal rules publicly available?
AT CY DK FR EL LV LT LU HR IE HU MT NL DE PT RO SE UK
council’s web 
site ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
press releases ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
briefings with 
journalists ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
press 
conferences ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
presented in 
parliament ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
other, please 
specify ●
Source: Author’s questionnaire results.
Other: 
Germany – by presentation in the parliament and legally secured in special cases (presenta-
tion of reports in case of non-compliance with fiscal rules in the Federal Parliament and in the 
State Parliaments).
Netherlands – The Quarterly Review, a CPB publication related to the budget cycle, provides 
numerous opportunities for assessing compliance with national and EU fiscal rules.
Portugal – a web site release – in the annual fiscal performance reports, annual budget plans 
and medium-term stability programs.
Sweden – annual report is published in electronic and printed form.
Fewer than half of the councils surveyed rate the visibility of published informa-
tion they provide as adequate, i.e. transmitted or published by all major media, 
followed by a public debate. In Sweden, for example, the annual report draws a lot 
of attention from newspapers and television. Newspaper articles and editorials 
comment on the report, and representatives refer to it in parliamentary debates. 
Eight councils also replied that all the mainstream media transmitted or published 
information on compliance with the rules, but this was not followed by public 
discussion. The Dutch council judges that the occasional visibility of CPB data 
allows assessment of compliance with the rules, but most of the time more atten-
tion is paid to deficit forecasts, as assessments of compliance with the rules are 
carried out by another agency, the National Council.4
Regarding the media visibility of councils’ assessments of fiscal rules (Question 
11) just over half (9 out of 17) of the councils replied that information on non-
compliance was transmitted by all major media and followed by public debate. In 
almost a third of the cases, mainstream media did transmit the information, but 
there was no public debate. For instance, councils in France and Romania reported 
4 More: www.raadvanstate.nl/the-council-of-state. At the time of the survey the CPB was listed in the EU Inde-
pendent fiscal institutions database. Today, both CPB and National Councils (which is active since 2014) are 
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364 that information on non-compliance was published in the media very seldom or 
never. Unsurprisingly, media reported more often on non-compliance than on 
compliance with the rules. This probably reflects the well-known media market 
strategy to provide readers with the negative news and criticism of government 
policies that they find more attractive. Furthermore, more than half of the councils 
(9 out of 17) stated that the government felt obliged to explain the reasons for the 
non-compliance identified by fiscal councils; more a than third (7 out of 17) 
replied that the government did not respond publicly (Question 12). 
Governments mostly responded to critical views of fiscal policy by respecting 
criticism and becoming more transparent (6 out of 17 councils), and by explaining 
the state of fiscal policy (Question 15). Almost half of the councils (6 out of 13) 
indicated that citizens did not react publicly even though they were mostly aware 
of the lack of transparency and accountability in the budget process (Question 21). 
Very few councils responded that the public was responsive to discussions and 
pressed for transparency and accountability. Very few also responded that they felt 
the public lacked knowledge and interest in public finances (2 out of 13 councils). 
This indicates that the councils do have an influence on the government through 
the media, and that the public does have an influence on the government, but not 
to the extent expected in the policy literature. The public generally hardly reacts 
to information about the lack of fiscal transparency and accountability. 
How could fiscal councils increase their impact on transparency and accountabil-
ity in the future? Answers summarised in Table 5 suggest a few good practices: 
increasing the number of public debates on fiscal policy in the media (9 out of 18 
councils); strengthening their powers through adjustments in national legislation 
(7 out of 18); and communicating more efficiently with the public (6 out of 18). 
The questionnaire further indicated that for the vast majority of councils, com-
munication with the public and public information were not regulated by law (see 
Table A5). The majority of councils did not view staffing problems as a major 
obstacle to increasing its influence (Table A6). 
A good starting point was that councils reported motivation of employees: 17 out 



































































44 (3) 355-384 (2020)
365Table 5
How can the impact of councils on fiscal transparency and accountability in the 
budget process be increased?




















● ● ● ● ● ●
by increasing 
the number of 
public debates 
on fiscal policy 
in the media
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
other, please 
specify ● ● ● ● ● ●
Source: Author’s questionnaire results.
Other:
France – the influence is already high. 
Ireland – by producing quality analyses and effectively communicating the results with the par-
liament. 
Portugal – building a reputation is essential in order to ensure social significance. If quality 
or independence is lacking in its analysis, no marketing plan could preserve the fiscal council.
Romania – by increasing the public awareness to be implicated in the process of how the govern-
ment spend the public money, not just in the short-term but also in the medium-term.
Sweden – A strong council needs a legislative background, but the legislative background does 
not guarantee a strong council. The strength of the institution ultimately depends on the quality 
and credibility of its work, not its legal status.
A closer look at fiscal councils in Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Swe-
den and UK provides additional insights. These councils seem to be aware of the 
importance of communication with the media for their role of “fiscal guardians”. 
In Ireland, the Netherlands Sweden and the UK communication with the public 
takes place in many different ways. By contrast, in Hungary it takes place only 
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366 The Dutch council plans to improve its communication strategy by increasing 
activities in social media. Most council publications are reviewed in the print and 
electronic media. 
These six councils mostly publish information on compliance with the rules on 
their websites through press releases, and by making presentations in parliament. 
Most active in terms of communication are the councils in Sweden and the UK. 
Respondents from the councils noted that information on compliance was trans-
mitted by all important media, and was followed by public discussions, notably in 
Ireland, Sweden and the UK. In Croatia and Hungary, there was less public dis-
cussion of councils’ findings. 
Governments in these countries generally responded to the councils’ findings on 
non-compliance with fiscal rules. In Sweden, the government was required to 
respond before passing another budget. In the UK, the government had to announce 
whether it had taken corrective measures. The Swedish council assessed fiscal 
transparency both as part of its regular duties and in its annual report. Govern-
ments in these countries appreciated councils’ work. In Sweden, the government 
regularly explained the reasons for the situation in response to the council’s criti-
cism. In the UK, the council presented information for others to judge and did not 
openly express critical views. 
Most of these six councils believed that preparing public reports that influence 
media reporting had the greatest impact on fiscal transparency (Table A7). All six 
councils assessed their impact on public information and on increasing fiscal 
transparency and accountability as good. Councils in the Netherlands and the UK 
pointed out that they generally worked with a high level of transparency. Public 
reactions to information that councils provide to the media vary across countries. 
In Croatia, these responses show up in a large number of follow-up reactions in 
the media; in Hungary, in public hearings and media pressure; in Ireland, in criti-
cal press reports; and in Sweden, in strong public support for fiscal discipline and 
the potentially high cost of financial irresponsibility. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper presents the findings from a questionnaire on media communication 
practices of fiscal councils in EU countries as a potential tool for increasing the 
transparency and accountability of public finances. Their mandate is to increase 
the visibility of compliance with fiscal rules through active communication with 
the public. More effective communication should in theory help improve fiscal 
transparency by making politicians accountable to the public for their manage-
ment of public finances. The purpose of the questionnaire was to assess to what 
extent this has been the case in practice. The findings show the following:
The best practices for fiscal councils to influence accountability of politicians in 
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367compliance with fiscal rules, frequent communication with the media, promotion 
of transparency and accountability, publication of analyses, evaluations and 
reports, and, last but not least, open and transparent work by fiscal councils them-
selves. 
Most fiscal councils assess the influence of their own work on the state of public 
finances and fiscal transparency as good. They find that they exert influence on the 
government and the public through the media, but not to the extent they would 
like. This is reflected, for instance, in the weak public reaction to councils’ find-
ings on the lack of fiscal transparency, and suggests that the councils need to put 
more effort into their media communication strategies. One obvious choice would 
be to make more intensive use of the digital media, as their influence is growing 
relative to traditional outlets like print.
Their influence could also be enhanced by increasing the number of public debates 
on fiscal policy in the media. Some councils would also benefit from stronger 
anchoring of their powers in national legislation, as recommended by the OECD. 
In sum, this paper provides some tentative evidence that fiscal councils in EU 
countries are able to help promote fiscal transparency and accountability. The 
councils themselves see some benefits of their work, and their monitoring of 
adherence to fiscal rules and warnings about excessive government spending 
noticed in the media. This informs the public, and may in turn influence politi-
cians’ ratings, thereby helping contribute to greater accountability in the manage-
ment of public finances.
Disclosure statement
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369APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE
1. How does your fiscal council communicate with the public?  





• social groups (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.)
• interviews
• PR or marketing agency
• other, please specify






• once a year 
• other, please specify
3. When does your fiscal council usually communicate with the public?  
(multiple replies possible)
•  when there are significant fiscal events (planning the state budget, present-
ing the draft state budget, the debate on the state budget in Parliament, the 
execution of the state budget)
• when changes in fiscal policy are being announced
• when tax-policy is out of the set framework
• in the time of the release of the compliance/incompliance with fiscal rules
• ahead of parliamentary elections and during the election campaign in order 
for the voters to be fairly informed about fiscal policy
• in case of major failures in the conduction of fiscal policy
• other, please specify
4. What is the average annual media coverage of the activities of your fiscal 
council?
• more than 10 releases in the media
• more than 20 releases in the media
• more than 50 releases in the media
• more than 100 releases in the media
• more than 150 releases in the media
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370 5. Which media issue the largest number of releases on the work of your 
fiscal council?
• print media (dailies, weeklies, monthlies, etc.)
• electronic media (radio, television, etc.)
• digital media (social groups, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.)
• online media (news portals, etc.)
Additional information
6. Which area do most of the media reports address?  
(multiple replies possible)
• activities of the Council
• analysis, assessments and reports of the Council
• criticism of the government’s fiscal policy
• trends in deficit and public debt
• transparency and accountability in the budget process
• other, please specify
7. What international media does your fiscal council use to send a message 
about the government’s fiscal policy to the world public? 
 (multiple replies possible)
• news agencies (Reuters, Bloomberg, etc.)
• The Financial Times and the like
• The Economist and the like
• international television channels (CNN, CNBC, etc.)
• they do not use any international media
• other, please specify
8. How much funding was allocated from the budget of your fiscal council 
for marketing and public relations in 2015 and 2016? (amount in EUR) 
• in 2015
• in 2016
• no data on the funding 
9. Is the monitoring of the compliance with fiscal rules publicly available? 
(multiple replies possible)
• on the web site of the Council
• press releases
• briefing with journalist
• press conferences
• presented in the Parliament
• other, please specify
10. How do you assess the media visibility of the compliance with fiscal rules?
• information about this is published/broadcast in all major media, followed 
by a public debate
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371• information about this is published/broadcast only in some media
• there is no, or insufficient, information about this in the media
• other, please specify
11. How do you assess the media visibility of noncompliance with fiscal rules?
• information about this is published/broadcast in all major media, followed 
by a public debate
• information about this is published/broadcast in all major media, no public 
debate
• information about this is published/broadcast only in some media
• there is not, or insufficient, information about this in the media
• other, please specify
12. Please describe the reaction of the government in relation to the assess-
ment of noncompliance with national fiscal rules
• reacts extremely negatively to the fiscal institution
• explains why it does not comply
• publicly announces it is taking corrective steps
• publicly explains why it does not take corrective steps
• usually does not react publicly
• other, please specify
13. How can IFIs contribute to the increase in the (politicians’) accountabil-
ity for not complying with fiscal rules? 
 (multiple replies possible)
• by better informing the public through the media about the importance of 
the compliance with the rules and the consequences of the noncompliance
• by educating politicians
• by educating the public
• by the influence of IFIs through the media on the politicians’ reputations 
• other, please specify
14. How to increase the media visibility of compliance with the rules?
• by more efficient communication with the public
• by creating a communication strategy with the public
• by earmarking the funds for marketing
• by increasing the funds for marketing
• by selecting individuals that have communication skills to head the institution
• other, please specify
15. Please describe the reaction of the government to critical views by your 
fiscal council on fiscal policy published in the media?
• The government generally respects the criticism, becoming more transpar-
ent and accountable.
• The government generally respects the criticism, but does not become 
more transparent and accountable.
• The government explains the reasons for the state of fiscal policy.
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372 • The government threatens that budgetary resources for the work of fiscal 
institutions will be reduced.
• The government reacts extremely negatively.
• The government generally does not react.
• Other, please specify.
16. How does your fiscal council affect the fiscal transparency and (politi-
cians’) accountability in the budget process? 
 (multiple replies possible)
• by promoting fiscal transparency and accountability
• by analysing fiscal transparency
• by supervising fiscal sustainability
• by preparing public reports that have significant media impact
• by promoting sound fiscal policy
• other, please specify
17. What do you see as the main cause of the growth of the deficits and public 
debts in your countries in the period from 2008 to 2015? 
 (multiple replies possible)
• excessive government spending in (good) times before the crisis
• poor risk management before the crisis
• inadequate and belated government response to the global financial crisis
• fiscal irresponsibility and lack of transparency
• politicians were disoriented during the crisis
• absence of fiscal rules
• noncompliance with fiscal rules
• non-existence of independent fiscal institutions
• introduction of flexible rules
• susceptibility to political discretion
• political misuse of state finances
• bad and irresponsible policies of EU member states
• increased spending before the elections and transfer of costs to the future 
generations
• insufficient and biased information to the public about the state of public 
finances
• there is no problem with deficit and public debt, and the public finances 
were stable
• other, please specify 
18. Does the higher media visibility of the compliance with rules and more 
effective communication of IFIs contribute to transparency and (politi-
cians’) accountability in the budget process?
• yes, please specify how
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37319. How to increase the impact of IFIs on fiscal transparency and (politi-
cians’) accountability in the budget process?
• by strengthening the power of IFIs through changing national legislation
• by strengthening the power of IFIs through changing European legislation 
(Stability and Growth Pact)
• by more efficient communication with the public
• by increasing the number of public debates on fiscal policy in the media
• other, please specify
20. What are the obstacles to any increase in the impact of your fiscal council 
on fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget pro-
cess? (multiple replies possible)
• insufficient staffing of Council
• lack of a communication strategy with the public
• council is not independent in the performance of its work
• government ignores Council media views on the state of fiscal policy
• media views and public discussions do not contribute to the better state of 
public finances
• low level of democracy in a society, which is why the impact of public has 
weakened 
• low level of press freedom, which is why the media do not publish critical 
views on the government’s fiscal policy
• other, please specify
21.   How does the public respond to the information in the media about the 
lack of transparency and (politicians’) responsibility in the budget process?
• by public debates and pressing politicians on more transparent and more 
responsible behaviour in the budget process
• by public discussions, but without pressing politicians on more transparent 
and more responsible behaviour in the budget process
• by constantly pressing politicians on more transparent and more responsi-
ble behaviour in the budget process
• has evidence of the lack of transparency and (politicians’) responsibility in 
the budget process, but is not responding
• has no knowledge of and shows no interest in the state of public finances
Additional information
22. How do you estimate the level of information of your citizens about the 
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374 Additional information 
23. What has so far been the impact of your fiscal council on the public infor-
mation about the state of public finances and on the increase in fiscal 







24. How do fiscal rules and IFIs influence transparency and (politicians’) 
accountability in the budget process?
• by informing the public through media, and the public then influences the 
politicians’ reputation and rating at the elections 
• by public disclosure of information about the compliance with fiscal rules 
and increased communication with the media
• by enhanced communication analysis, evaluation and reporting of inde-
pendent fiscal institutions
• by promoting fiscal transparency and accountability
• by transparency of the work of an independent fiscal institution as an 
example of good practice
• other, please specify
25.   When does your fiscal council especially issue warnings about the state of 
public finances? (multiple replies possible)
• in the event of a conflict between the proposed budget and the goals set out
• in the case of overoptimistic forecasts
• in the event of excessive government spending
• in the case of unsustainable tax policy
• in the case of worse fiscal performance than anticipated
• to indicate the actual state of fiscal policy
• to raise public awareness on the importance of sound public finances
• other, please specify
26. Do you think that fiscal rules and IFIs can be powerful communication 
tools in order to increase fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accounta-
bility in the budget process?
• yes, please specify how
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375Table a1
EU fiscal councils that responded to the questionnaire
Country Council Year of 
founding 
AT Fiscal Advisory Council 2002
CY Fiscal Council 2013
DK Danish Economic Council 1962
FR High Council for Public Finance (HCFB) 2013
EL Parliamentary Budget Office 2010
HR Commission on Fiscal Policy 2013
IE Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) 2011
LT State Audit Office 2013
LV Fiscal Discipline Council 1990
LU Court of Auditors 1999
HU Fiscal Council 2009
MT National Audit Office 2013
NL Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) 1945
DE Independent Advisory Board to the Stability Council 2013
PT Public Finance Council 2012
RO Fiscal Policy Council 2010
SE Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 2007
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376 Table a2
When does your fiscal council usually communicate with the public?
AT CY DK FR EL LV LT LU HR IE HU MT NL DE PT RO SE UK 
significant 
fiscal events ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
changes in in 
fiscal policy ● ● ●
tax policy is 















fiscal policy ● ● ●
other ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Source: Author’s questionnaire results.
Other: 
Austria – by publication calendar (studies, recommendations, etc.).
Cyprus – every fall and spring (specified in legislation) if it considers that EU or national rules 
have been breached.
Denmark – the Council meets twice a year and the Presidency prepare a report for each Council 
meeting. The report contains economic analysis and policy recommendations on economic pol-
icy, as well as short and medium-term forecasts on the key indicators of the Danish economy. 
The report also includes the Presidency assessment of fiscal policy goals – e.g. adherence to the 
national Budget Law, adherence to EU rules and assessment of long-term fiscal sustainability. 
The Presidency is independently responsible for the reports and acts as a Danish “fiscal watch-
dog”. The preliminary version of the report is presented and discussed at the Council meeting. The 
reports are published immediately after the meeting. Council members’ comments are added in the 
final version of the report. Following the Council meeting the Presidency holds a press conference.
France – for each budget and SGP.
Ireland – with regard to the first reply, the primary Council communicates with the public at the 
time of the release of the main reports. Council members and the president sometimes partici-
pate in media interviews throughout the year. The president usually participates in fewer media 
inclusions, the morning after the annual budget is announced in October each year, to give an 
initial reaction to the budget.
Latvia – the Law on Fiscal Discipline gives the Latvian Fiscal Council a broad mandate (Article 
28) so that it communicates in all cases where it considers it important.
Netherlands – CPB publishes Quarterly Reviews, a budget cycle publication. This provides 
numerous opportunities for assessing compliance with national and EU fiscal rules. In September, 
opposition parties seek an analysis of their alternative budget. The CPB provides analysis of 
political parties’ electoral programs. It also provides analysis of Government agreements and 
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377Portugal – usually when a publication is issued or when a senior council member intervenes at a public event. It publishes an average of 1.5 publications per month, but amount is not the 
same every month.
Romania – on the eve of parliamentary elections and during the election campaign to keep vot-
ers impartially informed – only when the Council is asked.
Sweden – FPC may decide to hold a press conference at a time when it believes there is a fail-
ure in fiscal policy (breach of fiscal rule) and a need for action (e.g. regarding fiscal effects of 
immigration in 2015). FPC does not hold regular press conferences and tries to stay away from 
direct involvement in the budget process or election campaigns.
UK – in the case of significant fiscal developments and medium-term forecasts while all other 
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378 Table a3
When does your fiscal council especially give warnings about the state of public 
finances?






● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
overoptimistic 




● ● ● ● ● ● ●
unsustainable 





● ● ● ●
indicate the 
actual state of 
fiscal policy
● ● ● ● ● ●
to raise public 
awareness ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
other ● ● ● ● ● ●
Source: Author’s questionnaire results.
Other: 
Denmark – the Council meets twice a year and the Presidency prepares a report for each of the 
meetings. The report contains economic analysis and policy recommendations on economic pol-
icy, as well as short- and medium-term forecasts on the key indicators of the Danish economy. 
It also includes the Presidency assessment of fiscal policy goals – e.g. adherence to the national 
Budget Law and to EU rules, and assessment of long-term fiscal sustainability. The Presidency 
is independently responsible for the reports and acts as a Danish “fiscal watchdog”. The pre-
liminary version of the report is presented and discussed at the Council meeting. The reports 
are published immediately after the meeting. Council members’ comments are added in the final 
version of the report. Following the Council meeting, the Presidency holds a press conference.
Germany – alerts are inseparable with the tasks of the Stability Council. It makes significant ref-
erence to budgetary surveillance to avoid budgetary urgency (warning of a specified budgetary 
emergency) and to monitoring compliance with EU budgetary discipline requirements (more on 
tasks on the Council’s website).
Netherlands – the CPB provides the data for assessment. It does not provide explicit warnings.
Portugal – whenever CFB publishes its regular reports. Council does not publish analyses or 
comments in reaction to particularly events.
Romania – in the case of major fiscal measures envisaged by the government.
UK – OBR publishes its forecasts at the same time as the Ministry of Finance the main announce-
ment of the policy. The OBR does not give warnings about the “state” of public finances, but pre-
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379Table a4
Which topics do media reports address?
AT CY DK FR EL LV LT LU HR IE HU MT NL DE PT RO SE UK 
activities of 




● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
criticism of 








● ● ● ● ●
other ●
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380 Table a5
The legal determination of the councils’ communication with the public
Council Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) – Communication with the public
Denmark The type and timing of the reports is published on  De Økonomiske Råd
France Under the law in place, the council publishes opinions on  Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques
Greece
There is no FRA or legally determined public release  
of information, but it does publish certain information on 
Parliamentary Budget Office
Luxembourg
There is no FRA nor is a specific public disclosure of information 
determined, but certain information is published on  
Cour des comptes du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg
Croatia The FRA and the Rules of Procedure determine the publication of certain information on 9th term of the Croatian Parliament
Ireland
The FRA does not specify how information and / or communication 
with the media is published, but it is transparent on  
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council
Hungary The Action Plan determines the publication of information on  Action Planof the Fiscal Council for the year 2016
The Netherlands
The manner and dynamics of information publication  
and communication are published on CPB Netherlands Bureau  
for Economic Policy Analysis
Germany
Several laws determine the operation of the council, and the public 
disclosure of the report is determined by specific rules and 
procedures. Available at The Stability Council
Portugal
Article 32 FRA provides for the publication of a report and all 
relevant information for the operation of the council on  
Porutguese Public Finance Council
Sweden The manner and dynamics of information publication and communication are published on Swedish fiscal policy council
UK
Several laws define the work of the OBR, as well as the manner and 
dynamics of information disclosure, emphasizing transparency in its 
work, and in particular the Budget Accountability Charter.  
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381Table a6
What are the obstacles to increasing the impact of your council on fiscal transpar-
ency and accountability in the budget process?
AT CY DK FR EL LV LT LU HR IE HU MT NL DE PT RO SE UK 
insufficient 
staffing of the 
council
● ● ● ● ● ● ●








and media views 
on the state of 
fiscal policy
●
media views and 
public 
discussions do 
not contribute to 
the better state of 
public finances 
● ●
low level of 
democracy in a 
society, which is 
why the impact 
of the public is 
weak 
● ●
low level of press 
freedom, which 
is why media do 
not publish 




specify ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Source: Author’s questionnaire results.
Other: 
France – no obstacles.
Germany – no obstacles, as the federal budgetary autonomy system does not permit direct con-
trol of the budget process, e.g. the process of drafting government budgetary and financial plans 
by the central instance. The parliaments enacting the budgetary and financial plans are highest 
instance representing the public. 
Greece – our office should have a more “executive role” (in the legislative sense).
Ireland – insufficient staff of the council is currently not the major issue but could be a limiting 
factor in the future if demands on the council increase.
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382 Luxembourg – still lacking access to data; “comply or explain” principle could be clarified in the long term through the Memorandum of understanding.
Malta – usually media do not properly emphasize the state of public finances, unless there are 
significant risks of severe deterioration in fiscal position, or serious noncompliance with the EU 
fiscal rules. 
Netherlands – no major obstacles.
Romania – reputational costs for politicians and government are not contained in legislation.
Sweden – we are a small institution (staff of five people) so there are limits to what we can do, 
but we really enjoy independence and are free to communicate with the public whenever and in 
whatever way we choose.
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